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CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’S INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE: THE LAWLESS MEDICINE OF NFIB
V. SEBELIUS
Gregory P. Magarian*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius1 (NFIB) shocked the legal world. Many observers
predicted the decision’s central holding: that Congress in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act2 (PPACA) had proper constitutional
authority to impose the Act’s “individual mandate,” which requires that all
Americans purchase health insurance if they can afford it. Almost everyone
expected the Court’s four more liberal Justices to vote to uphold the Act
and at least three of the Court’s conservatives to vote to strike most or all of
it down. Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion, however, produced a cascade
of surprises. The conservative Chief Justice joined the Court’s liberals in
upholding the individual mandate; he reached that conclusion based on
Congress’s taxing power, rather than its powers under the Commerce
Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause; he nonetheless declaimed at
length about how those other powers did not support the mandate; and he
struck down a key element in the Act’s expansion of Medicaid. Meanwhile,
the Court’s four other conservative Justices filed a jointly authored dissent
that conspicuously failed to endorse even those aspects of the Chief
Justice’s opinion on which all five conservatives agreed, while two of the
Court’s liberals—Justices Breyer and Kagan—joined the Chief Justice,
without comment, in weakening the Medicaid expansion.
Chief Justice Roberts’s leadership in upholding the individual mandate
left conservatives fuming, liberals beaming, and commentators falling over
one another to praise the Chief Justice’s courage, resistance to partisanship,
and embrace of judicial restraint. “For bringing the Court back from the
partisan abyss,” wrote Jeffrey Rosen in a representative paean, “Roberts
deserves praise not only from liberals but from all Americans who believe
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that it’s important for the Court to stand for something larger than politics.”3
Echoed Linda Greenhouse: “[The Chief Justice] spoke for the country. His
decision . . . saved the Supreme Court from the stench of extreme
partisanship that has hung over the health care litigation . . . .”4 Harvard
Law School Dean Martha Minow wrote that Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion served to “revive respect for the judiciary” at a politically divisive
moment by “signal[ing] a commitment to separating the judiciary from
politics in method, tone, and results.”5
This Essay challenges that heroic narrative. Chief Justice Roberts’s
legal analysis in NFIB runs from inadequate to improper, leaving the nation
with a profoundly lawless resolution of a singularly important legal
controversy. I share the prevalent assumption that the Chief Justice voted to
uphold the individual mandate out of a deeply held concern for the Court’s
institutional reputation. I also agree with most of the Chief Justice’s
cheerleaders that the PPACA is both a constitutionally proper enactment
and good (though in my view not nearly optimal) public policy. Even so, I
believe the Chief Justice’s idiosyncratic resolution of NFIB—his own
individual mandate—will do the Court, and the nation, far more harm than
good. To call a judicial opinion “lawless” can mean two things: either the
opinion literally contains no law, which leaves it lawless in what I will call
a descriptive sense; or it reflects an active contempt for law as properly
understood, which makes it lawless in what I will call a normative sense.
The Chief Justice’s opinion manages to exemplify both senses of
lawlessness, failing to provide sufficient legal justification for any of his
major conclusions while violating fundamental norms of constitutional
judicial review.
I.

THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE ANALYSIS: BURNING THE STATUTE IN
ORDER TO SAVE IT
The most prominent target of the legal challenge to the PPACA, the
individual mandate, requires people who can afford insurance to purchase it
or else pay a penalty to the federal government.6 The government posited
three alternative sources of constitutional authority for the mandate: the
power to regulate interstate commerce;7 the Necessary and Proper Clause,8
3
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as an adjunct to the commerce power; and, based on the penalty option, the
taxing power.9 Chief Justice Roberts, in a portion of his opinion joined by
no other Justice, but echoed by the four joint dissenters (Justices Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), thoroughly and emphatically rejected the
government’s reliance on the commerce power and the Necessary and
Proper Clause. This portion of the Chief Justice’s opinion indulges in
needless constitutional analysis while creating no legally binding precedent.
As such, it is both normatively and descriptively lawless. Then, in the most
practically significant portion of his opinion, the Chief Justice wrote for a
54 majority (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan)
in upholding the mandate under the taxing power. This portion of the
opinion relies on two crucial legal premises that it fails to defend, rendering
it descriptively lawless.
A. Advice We Don’t Need
The PPACA’s individual mandate is a novel provision in federal law.
Never before has the federal government required citizens to purchase a
good in the private marketplace.10 The Act maintains our health care
system’s reliance on private insurance, but it imposes several new
regulatory constraints on private insurers.11 The individual mandate offsets
these requirements by forcing lower risk people into the insurance pool,
requiring everyone to purchase private insurance or pay a penalty to the
government. The government in NFIB primarily defended the mandate on
the ground that it directly regulated the interstate market in medical
insurance. In the alternative, the government argued that the remainder of
the PPACA properly regulated interstate commerce—a premise no one
seriously disputes—and the mandate was a necessary and proper measure to
effectuate that regulation.
Chief Justice Roberts spends fifteen pages of his opinion refuting these
contentions.12 The Chief Justice begins by adding to the Court’s Commerce
Clause jurisprudence a novel distinction between regulation of commercial
action and regulation of commercial “inaction.”13 He rejects the commerce
power as a basis for the individual mandate because the mandate “does not
regulate existing commercial activity [but] instead compels individuals to

9

Id. cl. 1.
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become active in commerce by purchasing a product . . . .”14 Validating the
mandate as a Commerce Clause regulation “would justify a mandatory
purchase to solve almost any problem”15 and, more broadly, would
“permit[] Congress to reach beyond the natural extent of its
authority . . . .”16 The Chief Justice dismisses the government’s claim that
the uninsured affect the health care market because they will inevitably use
health care services: “[W]e have never permitted Congress to anticipate . . .
[commercial activity] in order to regulate individuals not currently engaged
in commerce.”17
The Chief Justice’s rejection of the Commerce Clause theory sets up
his rejection of the government’s alternative theory that the Necessary and
Proper Clause authorizes the individual mandate. He maintains that letting
Congress regulate commercial inactivity in the service of the power to
regulate actual commerce would “vest[] Congress with the extraordinary
ability to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated
power.”18 Thus, while Congress may have considered the mandate
“necessary” for effectuating its Commerce Clause authority to regulate the
interstate market in health care services, the Chief Justice finds that the
mandate was not a “proper” means of doing so.19 The joint dissent echoes
and elaborates the Chief Justice’s conclusions about the commerce power
and the Necessary and Proper Clause,20 but none of the joint dissenters join
any part of his opinion. Justice Ginsburg’s separate opinion, in contrast,
lacerates Chief Justice Roberts’s analyses of the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.21
Perhaps the individual mandate’s distinctive requirements will limit the
significance of the Chief Justice’s analysis for future challenges to federal
programs. Nonetheless, his restrictive analysis takes by far the Court’s most
aggressive posture against federal power since the Justices struck down core
elements of the New Deal seventy-five years ago.22 The Chief Justice’s
action–inaction distinction has the potential to undermine any federal
mandate that requires regulated entities to take new actions.23 In addition, as
14

Id. at 2573.
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See id. at 2615–29 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
22
See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act as exceeding congressional authority under the Commerce Clause).
23
Indeed, the Chief Justice suggests that federal commands to act may only survive constitutional
review if grounded in “constitutional provisions other than the Commerce Clause.” NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at
2586 n.3 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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Justice Ginsburg points out, both the Chief Justice and the joint dissent
appear to harbor within their federal power arguments an economic
substantive due process theory, under which the mandate really offends the
Constitution by undermining economic liberty.24 Chief Justice Roberts,
channeling widespread political anxiety about the mandate, frets that
“[a]ccepting the Government’s theory would give Congress . . . license to
regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between
the citizen and the Federal Government.”25 Taken to its logical extreme, a
substantive due process analysis of the PPACA could reanimate the
Lochner era’s constitutionalization of laissez-faire economics.26
But at present, none of what Justice Ginsburg sharply calls “the Chief
Justice’s Commerce Clause essay”27 means anything at all for the law. In
both a descriptive sense and a deeper normative sense, this portion of his
opinion is profoundly lawless. The Chief Justice’s analysis of the commerce
power and the Necessary and Proper Clause announces no legal holding of
the Court. No other Justice joined or concurred in this portion of his
opinion; it represents the Chief Justice’s solitary view. Why did the four
joint dissenters, who echo the Chief Justice’s restrictive federal power
analysis, decline even to concur in his judgment? Presumably because this
part of the Chief Justice’s opinion announces no judgment in which to
concur. The commerce power and Necessary and Proper Clause analyses
are entirely unnecessary to the Chief Justice’s ultimate judgment upholding
the individual mandate.
The descriptive absence of law in Chief Justice Roberts’s cramped
analysis of federal power points toward the sense in which this portion of
his opinion is also normatively lawless. Why, if the discussion of the
commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause forms no part of the
Court’s ultimate judgment, does the Chief Justice discuss those issues at
all? His attempted justification, responding to criticism by Justice
Ginsburg,28 states that
the statute reads more naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax,
and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is only
because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that it is
necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only because we have a
24
See id. at 2623 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
25
Id. at 2589 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
26
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (finding strong constitutional protection for a right
to contract). This is not the first time that critics of the Roberts Court’s conservative majority have noted
echoes of Lochner in its opinions. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s extension of First Amendment protection to commercial
data mining repeats the error of Lochner).
27
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
28
See id. at n.12.
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duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly possible, that [the individual
mandate] can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding the Commerce Clause
question, I would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction. 29

In essence, the Chief Justice tells us that, when a court considers a
constitutional challenge to federal authority that the government defends on
several alternative grounds, the court should first organize the government’s
justifications along a spectrum from most to least intuitively “natural” and
then fully analyze and pronounce a legal holding on each of those
constitutional justifications, in order of “naturalness,” until (a) the court
finds one of them straightforwardly persuasive or (b) it rejects all
justifications save the last one. If the court reaches the last justification, it
should construe the statute if possible to support that justification, leaving
all its foregoing constitutional pronouncements in place and in force.
Chief Justice Roberts’s methodology radically departs from wellestablished norms of constitutional judicial review. Justice Brandeis,
concurring in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority,30 offers the classic
formulation of what we now call the canon of constitutional avoidance.
Two distinct but related elements of that canon matter for assessing NFIB.
First, a court that reviews a constitutional challenge to a statute must
determine whether some independent ground for decision obviates the need
to decide the constitutional question at all.31 Second, if compelled to address
the statute’s constitutionality, the court must construe the statute, if
possible, in a manner that avoids the need to declare the statute
unconstitutional.32
The government in NFIB offered three alternative constitutional
grounds—the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
Taxing Clause—as justifications for the individual mandate. In order to
strike down the mandate, the Court would have had to render a
constitutional judgment that each of the three alternative grounds failed as a
basis for congressional authority.33 To uphold the mandate, the Court
needed only to render a decision that one of the three alternative grounds
supported the mandate. Upholding the mandate might or might not have
entailed a sympathetic construction under the second Ashwander principle.
What the Court had no need to do, under any scenario, was render a
constitutional judgment about more than one of the three alternative

29

Id. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). For a discussion of the Chief Justice’s taxing power
analysis, see infra Part I.B.
30
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
31
See id. at 347–48 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
32
Id. at 348.
33
Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that neither the Commerce Clause
nor the Fourteenth Amendment supported the civil damages provision of the Violence Against Women
Act).
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grounds if it found any of those grounds sufficient to support the mandate.34
But that is exactly what Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion does. He argues, in
effect, that he needed to eviscerate the first Ashwander command—make no
unnecessary constitutional decisions—in order to fulfill the second:
construe a statute, where possible, in a manner that renders it constitutional.
Never before has a Supreme Court Justice pronounced these two principles,
articulated by Justice Brandeis as complementary elements in a scheme of
judicial restraint, mutually exclusive.
The canon of constitutional avoidance invites the criticism that
avoidance enables the Court to send a strong signal about a constitutional
issue without expending the institutional capital to make an actual
decision.35 We do not want the Court to influence the development of
constitutional law under cover of a doctrine meant to avert unnecessary
constitutional decisions.36 Chief Justice Roberts’s analyses of the commerce
power and the Necessary and Proper Clause manage to double down on the
canon’s troubling allowance for sub rosa constitutional decisionmaking,
even as they flout its dictates. The Chief Justice renders a legally
unnecessary constitutional decision that limits federal power, as a necessary
predicate—he tells us—for a tenuous saving construction imposed to avoid
having to render a constitutional decision that limits federal power. From
the government’s standpoint, this approach yields the worst of both
constitutional worlds: the Chief Justice explicitly weakens two sources of
government power on his way in the door and implicitly weakens a third on
his way out.
A judge with any commitment to judicial restraint would treat the
government’s justifications for the mandate not as a sequential obstacle
course but as analytic elements of a single problem. She might conclude, in
reasoning through the case, that the commerce power and the Necessary and
Proper Clause could not sustain the mandate. But if she further concluded
that the taxing power supported the mandate, the constitutional avoidance
canon would properly lead her to write an opinion that discussed only that
outcome-determinative theory. Which theory the judge found most natural
would make no difference in how the judge wrote her opinion. Likewise,
the determination to employ a saving construction, if the judge found that
step necessary to validate the government’s most persuasive theory, would
34
Courts sometimes state two alternative legal conclusions in support of a result. That sort of
decision can cause difficulty in identifying which conclusion forms the controlling legal basis for the
court’s holding. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037–38 (1983) (discussing the problem of
determining which of two independent, adequate legal grounds for a lower court decision the Court
should recognize as controlling). Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB deviates even further from sound
judicial practice because he announces legal conclusions that have no claim to relevance for his ultimate
holding.
35
See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 86–88.
36
See id. at 88–89 (arguing that rational legislators will treat the tacit constitutional judgments that
constitutional avoidance entails as authoritative).
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simply become part of the background analysis that she performed before
writing. Chief Justice Roberts’s methodology, in contrast, requires a judge
to show all the work he performs en route to his result, making conclusive
legal pronouncements about discarded alternative theories. A more
destructive inversion of constitutional avoidance is hard to imagine.
This Essay does not object on substantive federalism grounds to Chief
Justice Roberts’s reasoning in NFIB.37 Rather, my charge of normative
lawlessness rests entirely on a procedural objection: the Chief Justice did
not need to write a word about the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and
Proper Clause in order to reach his legal conclusion. A legal positivist
might assert that, if the Chief Justice of the United States portrays what he
writes as legally necessary, then it is legally necessary. But anyone who
values “a government of laws, and not of men”38 should condemn the flimsy
pretext under which Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB denigrates congressional
power. The Chief Justice’s mischief skirts the far edge of the Article III
command that federal courts may render judgments only about “Cases” and
“Controversies.”39 His discussion of the commerce power and the Necessary
and Proper Clause reads very much like an impermissible advisory
opinion.40 It is advice we don’t need and should disregard.
B. A Tax by Any Other Name
Having rejected the government’s justifications for the individual
mandate under the commerce power and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion turns to the mandate’s final hope:
Congress’s power to impose taxes. The argument that the taxing power
supports the mandate rests on the PPACA’s allowance that persons whom
the Act requires to carry private medical insurance may, in lieu of
purchasing insurance, pay a penalty to the IRS. 41 The argument presented a
37

Elsewhere I have sketched the grounds for a substantive objection. See Gregory P. Magarian,
Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1224–36 (2001) (critiquing
conventional justifications for protecting state prerogatives in constitutional law). Other scholars have
criticized NFIB on this basis. See, e.g., Robin West, Exit Rights: Roberts’ Conception of America in the
ACA Decision, JURIST F. (July 25, 2012), http://jurist.org/forum/2012/07/robin-west-aca-roberts.php
(critiquing the Chief Justice’s opinion as validating a strongly individualist, atomistic political
philosophy).
38
John Adams, To the Inhabitants of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, March 6, 1775, in
NOVANGLUS, AND MASSACHUSETTENSIS; OR POLITICAL ESSAYS 78, 84 (Boston, Hews & Goss 1819)
(1775) (emphasis removed).
39
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
40
Cf. Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2006 (1994) (suggesting that
“statements a judge makes knowing them to have no direct precedential weight, but which she
nevertheless hopes will be influential . . . in some sense . . . violate[] the rule against advisory
opinions”).
41
See I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(1) (Supp. V 2012).
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distinctive structural problem. The Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) bars
taxpayers from challenging the legality of any tax prior to paying the tax.42
Because the individual mandate does not become effective until 2014, no
one has yet had to pay a penalty pursuant to the mandate. Accordingly, a
conclusion by the Court that the mandate amounted to a tax would have
seemed to require dismissal of the immediate challenges to the mandate,
subject to reconsideration of the mandate’s validity once someone in 2014
paid the penalty and sued to recover the payment.
To most observers’ surprise, the taxing power formed the sole basis for
Chief Justice Roberts’s decisive vote to uphold the individual mandate and,
with it, the rest of the PPACA. The Chief Justice’s taxing power discussion
bifurcates his statutory and constitutional analyses of the mandate. As a
statutory matter, the Chief Justice emphasizes that the Act clearly identifies
the mandate as a “penalty.”43 That identification, he explains, authoritatively
places the mandate outside the protection of the AIA, allowing the Court to
consider the substantive constitutional challenge immediately.44 As a
constitutional matter, the Chief Justice construes the mandate as a proper
enactment under the taxing power. The PPACA’s penalty language, though
conclusive on the AIA question, does not constrain the Court’s inquiry
whether, and how, the Constitution authorized Congress to enact the
mandate.45 Indeed, the Chief Justice notes, the Court in past cases has
sustained under the taxing power measures not labeled taxes.46 Payments
pursuant to the individual mandate will raise revenue for the government,
helping to offset the cost of providing medical services to people who
refuse to buy insurance. Based on several factors—the payment cannot
exceed the cost of private medical insurance, the mandate contains no
scienter requirement, the Act empowers the IRS to collect the payment by
ordinary means, and the conduct that triggers the payment need not be
classed as unlawful—the Chief Justice concludes that the Court can fairly
uphold the mandate under the taxing power.47
In contrast to Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis of the commerce power
and the Necessary and Proper Clause, his taxing power analysis makes law,
insofar as it holds that the Constitution gave Congress the power to enact
the individual mandate. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court’s four
liberal Justices, joined the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis, providing

42

I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
See I.R.C. §§ 5000A(b), (g)(1).
44
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 258284 (2012).
45
See id. at 259495; see also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) (“The
question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power
which it undertakes to exercise.”).
46
See id. at 2595.
47
See id. at 2595–97.
43
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the only outright majority for any aspect of his opinion.48 The legal basis for
the Chief Justice’s disposition, however, remains elusive. The conclusion
that the taxing power saves the mandate rests on two critical premises that
he fails to defend in any substantial way. That absence of legal support
renders the Chief Justice’s taxing power analysis descriptively lawless.
First, Chief Justice Roberts posits that Congress in the PPACA waived
the AIA’s protection by declining to label the individual mandate a tax.
“The Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care Act,” he explains, “are
creatures of Congress’s own creation. How they relate to each other is up to
Congress . . . .”49 When the Court inquires into that relationship, “the best
evidence of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”50 Those propositions
make sense, as far as they go. Congress must have power to waive the
AIA’s protection explicitly.51 When Congress makes no explicit statement,
the Court should make a text-based inquiry into Congress’s intent. The
Chief Justice, however, provides no additional legal grounding for his
analysis; and beyond those starting points, difficult questions quickly arise.
Should not the AIA’s purpose of shielding revenue measures from
premature legal challenges—a purpose that serves both the government’s
interest in not defending overzealous lawsuits and the judiciary’s interest in
not adjudicating them—lead the Court to inquire, in determining whether
Congress intended the AIA to shield a given revenue measure, whether or
not the measure in effect imposes a tax?52 Even if the Court should not make
such a substantive inquiry, is any evidence beyond the fact that Congress
happened to call a measure a tax or a penalty relevant to the AIA inquiry, or
must Congress recite the word tax to avoid waiving the AIA’s protection?
The task of determining whether or not the AIA barred the NFIB challenge
should have prompted thoughtful consideration of these questions. Instead,
the Chief Justice simply reduces his examination of “Congress’s intent” to a
48

Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice Sotomayor, also concurred in the portion of
Chief Justice Roberts’s judgment that severs the unconstitutional spending condition in the Act’s
expansion of Medicaid, although she vigorously disputes the underlying constitutional judgment. See id.
at 2641–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
For a discussion of the Medicaid expansion, see infra Part II.
49
Id. at 2583 (opinion of the Court).
50
Id.
51
The Chief Justice goes so far as to suggest that Congress may secure the AIA’s protection for any
measure it labels a tax, even if the Court concludes that the measure is not a tax at all. He supports that
proposition with a single citation to a ninety-year-old case. See id. (citing Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16
(1922)). The idea that Congress may implicate the Court in a categorical charade would seem to demand
a more thorough defense, but the Chief Justice shows no interest in scrutinizing a notion that points
toward the conclusion he wants to reach.
52
Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 740 (1974) (finding, in concluding that the AIA
barred a pre-enforcement suit against revocation of a tax exemption, “no evidence that [the revocation]
does not represent a good-faith effort to enforce the technical requirements of the tax laws,” and
emphasizing that the challenger “has not shown that the [Internal Revenue] Service’s action is without
an independent basis in the requirements of the [Tax] Code”).
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robotic word search, follows that approach to his preferred outcome, and
leaves a void where legal analysis belongs.53
Second, Chief Justice Roberts concludes, after positing that the Taxing
Clause authorizes only taxes and not penalties, that the individual mandate
falls on the proper side of the divide.54 The Court for decades has taken a
highly lenient posture toward the taxing power, treating any measure that
raises revenue as a tax.55 But the Chief Justice, startlingly, revives the longinterred proposition that the Taxing Clause does not empower Congress to
impose penalties. He even holds up the notorious restrictive analysis of the
Child Labor Tax Case56 as his exemplar of judicial review under the Taxing
Clause.57 He does not define the universe of impermissible penalties, but he
expends considerable energy to establish that the individual mandate is not
one. The four joint dissenters, in contrast, carry the Chief Justice’s
indulgence of the taxpenalty distinction all the way home. They insist that
the Court has never upheld under the taxing power any law that imposes
“[a] penalty for constitutional purposes,”58 and they argue vigorously that
the mandate is just such a penalty.
The Chief Justice’s response to the joint dissenters’ argument boils
down to a single precedent: United States v. Sotelo,59 which validated a
penalty for nonpayment of taxes as a nondischargeable tax within the
meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.60 But Sotelo, as the joint dissenters easily
respond, did not present an issue about the constitutional authority for any
congressional enactment.61 In fact, the issue in that case closely resembled
the AIA question in NFIB, requiring the Court to decide only whether the
penalty at issue fit within another statutory definition of tax. The Chief
Justice’s rejoinder—that both Sotelo and NFIB are statutory construction
53

The joint dissent, which also purports to consider the AIA question, reaches the same conclusion
as the Chief Justice based on even shallower analysis. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2655–56 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
54
See id. at 2596–97 (opinion of the Court).
55
See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2182, 2200–04 (2004)
(describing the wide range of revenue measures that the Court has permitted under the taxing power).
56
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922) (striking down a
tax on goods produced by child labor as a penalty not authorized by the taxing power).
57
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
58
Id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
59
436 U.S. 268 (1978).
60
See id. at 273–75. The Chief Justice cites other cases that either declined to extend the taxing
power to measures that Congress labeled taxes or upheld under the taxing power measures that Congress
did not label taxes. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95. Only in Sotelo, however, did the Court treat as a
tax what Congress labeled (and the Court acknowledged as) a penalty.
61
See id. at 2651 n.5 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting). The joint dissenters
similarly might have pointed out that another case the Chief Justice cites for the proposition that
categorical labels should not govern taxing power analysis, Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298
(1992), does not involve Congress’s taxing power at all but rather strikes down a state tax under the
Commerce Clause. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595.
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cases62—is either amateurish or disingenuous, and he is no amateur. His
taxing power analysis strongly suggests a renewed legitimacy for the
taxpenalty distinction; but he neglects to develop that suggestion into a
functional legal analysis, while also failing to explain how the supposed
distinction spares the individual mandate.63 These failings produce
descriptive lawlessness.
II. THE MEDICAID EXPANSION ANALYSIS: AN OFFER STATES
COULDN’T REFUSE?
The second primary object of the constitutional challenge to the
PPACA was the Act’s expansion of Medicaid, the longstanding federal
program that provides medical assistance to the poor. Most significantly,
the Act makes every person under age sixty-five with an income up to
133% of the federal poverty level eligible for Medicaid.64 The practical
complication of the expansion is that Medicaid has always been an exercise
in “cooperative federalism,” under which the federal government imposes
broad policy directives, provides the majority of funding, and oversees the
program, while the states decide on numerous aspects of implementation,
provide substantial funding, and administer the program.65 To ensure that
states would effectuate Congress’s changes to Medicaid, the Act contained
a leverage provision that allowed the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to withhold up to 100% of Medicaid funding from any state that
refused to implement the expansion.66 Chief Justice Roberts—joined
without comment and perhaps opportunistically by Justices Breyer and
Kagan67 and substantively supported by the four joint dissenters—held this
condition on federal funding unduly coercive, in violation of Congress’s
constitutional authority to spend money.68
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See id. at n.7.
For an effort both to justify reviving the tax–penalty distinction and to explain why that
distinction should not doom the individual mandate, see Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the
Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012). Professors Cooter
and Siegel express strong approval of Chief Justice Roberts’s tax analysis in NFIB, see id. at 1247–52,
but they deserve credit for trying to fill the analytic holes the Chief Justice left gaping.
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42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. V 2012). The Act also extends certain minimum
coverage provisions of Medicaid to the newly eligible beneficiaries. See id. §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b),
18022(b).
65
See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 444–49 (2011)
(discussing the genesis of Medicaid and the program’s division of authority between the federal
government and the states).
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See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006).
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Justices Breyer and Kagan’s complicity in this part of the Chief Justice’s opinion might enable
them to argue credibly in a later case that the Court should resolve the opinion’s ambiguities in a more
permissive manner for congressional spending conditions.
68
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress “Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide for
the . . . general Welfare of the United States”).
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The Court’s leading decision on the spending power as a regulatory
lever, South Dakota v. Dole,69 provides what scant authority exists for the
Chief Justice’s spending power analysis. The Court has long held that the
spending power allows Congress to achieve, through spending leverage,
policy outcomes that it might lack power to achieve under the Commerce
Clause.70 Dole specifies several criteria that Congress must satisfy when
imposing conditions on grants to states,71 none of which anyone seriously
accused the PPACA’s Medicaid condition of failing. After making its major
points, the Dole Court notes in passing “that in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass
the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”72 The Dole Court does
not elaborate on that single sentence. It offers no description of what might
constitute undue coercion, no indication that Congress has ever crossed the
line, and no suggestion of what remedy the Constitution might authorize the
Court to impose if Congress ever did so.
Chief Justice Roberts’s treatment of the Medicaid expansion dwells on
the Court’s decisions that bar Congress from “commandeering” state
institutions to implement federal policy.73 But he does not hold that the
expansion commandeered the states. The Chief Justice also foregrounds
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,74 which upheld against charges of undue
coercion the Social Security Act’s abatement of payroll taxes for employers
that paid money into federally certified state unemployment programs.75 But
he understandably rests no conclusions on Steward Machine, whose factual
context differs markedly from that of NFIB. Instead, the Chief Justice
parlays the Dole Court’s one-sentence anticoercion dictum into a severe
constraint on the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion. The Chief Justice calls the
Act’s allowance for the federal government to withhold all Medicaid
funding from a state that fails to comply with the Medicaid expansion “a
gun to the head.”76 He emphasizes the leverage provision’s massive stakes
for states, citing statistics that federal Medicaid funding accounts for over
twenty percent of most state budgets.77 The Chief Justice proclaims that the
69

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (endorsing Alexander Hamilton’s view that
Section 8’s authorization to spend for the “general welfare” enables regulation beyond the commerce
power).
71
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
72
Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
73
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602–03 (2012) (opinion of Roberts,
C.J.) (discussing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (barring commandeering of state executive
branch officials), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (barring commandeering of state
legislatures)).
74
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
75
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
76
Id. at 2604.
77
See id.
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Act’s Medicaid expansion does not, in fact, expand Medicaid. Instead, the
Act “enlist[s] the States in a new health care program.” 78 Congress could
not possibly have authority to hold federal funding for an existing program
hostage to ensure implementation of a new program. To remedy this
coercion, the Chief Justice fully excises the leverage provision from the
PPACA.79 NFIB leaves the Act’s substantive changes to Medicaid intact,
but the federal government now lacks any mechanism to ensure that states
implement them.
Beyond Chief Justice Roberts’s inflation of a sketchy dictum into a
pillar of Spending Clause doctrine, his analysis and disposition of the
Medicaid expansion reflect two critical ambiguities that render his opinion
on this issue legally incomprehensible, and thus descriptively lawless. First,
because the Medicaid Act explicitly authorizes Congress to expand or alter
the program,80 the Chief Justice’s holding depends on his treatment of
“existing Medicaid” and “new Medicaid” as two separate federal programs.
But his bifurcation of Medicaid has no basis in law or logic. By the Chief
Justice’s reasoning, every time the government purports to expand a
cooperative federalism program beyond its initial scope, it actually creates a
new program. With critical distance, the problem gets much worse. As
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes, Congress has in fact substantially changed
and expanded Medicaid on numerous occasions over the years.81 What
makes this expansion any different? The Chief Justice can offer no better
response than his semantic assertion that “[this] Medicaid expansion . . .
accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree.”82 The PPACA also applies
longstanding Medicaid procedures to the new beneficiaries.83 Does new
Medicaid somehow incorporate the numerous salient provisions of existing
Medicaid by reference? What constitutional principles would govern
congressional prerogatives if a state balked at applying an existingMedicaid procedure to a new-Medicaid beneficiary or to a mixture of new
and preexisting beneficiaries? At a broader level, should we now
understand the Dole anticoercion dictum as forbidding the government to
withhold funds from any existing program in order to ensure compliance
with any new federal requirement? Such a bar would upend the holding of
Dole that a spending condition must simply relate to some federal project or
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Id. at 2606.
See id. at 2607.
80
See 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2006).
81
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 263132, 263839 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
82
Id. at 2605 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
83
See id. at 2635 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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program.84 The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any grounding for his
cleavage of Medicaid suggests that its only justification is convenience.
Second, Chief Justice Roberts’s reasoning about coercion and
disposition of the Act’s leverage provision may—or may not—suffer from
a crucial disconnect. The Chief Justice emphasizes that Congress should not
be able to withhold all of a state’s funding under a government program in
order to encourage a state’s compliance with a federal policy, especially
when the funding amounts to a large portion of the state’s overall
revenues.85 Although that argument has only the barest basis in precedent
and rests on the dubious premise that states may credibly claim detrimental
reliance on federal funds, it at least makes a comprehensible claim. But the
Chief Justice proceeds to hold that Congress may not withhold any of a
state’s Medicaid funding to ensure compliance with the PPACA’s
expansion.86 That holding may simply reflect the Act’s architecture: striking
the entire leverage provision may have been the only way for the Court to
remedy the provision’s excessive, constitutionally impermissible
possibilities. That remedial explanation, however, ignores the plausible
alternatives of imposing a limiting construction on the leverage provision or
waiting to entertain as-applied challenges to actual federal withholding of
Medicaid funds. The remedial explanation for the Chief Justice’s “all”–
“any” disconnect also soft-pedals his objection to the leverage provision as
a “retroactive condition[],”87 an objection that suggests he might reject
federal power to impose even de minimis penalties for states’
noncompliance with the expansion. The Chief Justice, however, refuses to
wrestle or even engage with the question of how much coercion is too
much: “It is enough for today that wherever that line may be, this statute is
surely beyond it.”88
The Dole anticoercion dictum has proved notoriously difficult for
lower courts to administer, leading many courts and commentators to treat
the anticoercion principle as nonjusticiable.89 Chief Justice Roberts, in
giving the dictum serious legal effect for the first time, had a responsibility
to provide guidance to Congress should it seek to repair or replace the
PPACA’s leverage provision. May Congress pass a new authorization for
the Secretary to withhold up to, say, 5% of noncompliant states’ Medicaid
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See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–08 (1987).
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 260405 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
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See id. at 2607.
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Id. at 2637 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 25 (1981)).
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Id. at 2606.
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See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon Its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 78 IND.
L.J. 459, 485 (2003) (calling the anticoercion principle “at best, ill-suited for judicial administration and,
at worst, incoherent”).
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funds? If not, why not?90 The Chief Justice’s failure to provide any legal
insights as to these essential questions completes his NFIB opinion’s
catalog of descriptive lawlessness.
III. THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S INSTITUTIONAL STEWARDSHIP: A
QUESTIONABLE PLAN, BADLY EXECUTED
Perhaps my analysis to this point has judged Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion in NFIB too harshly by ignoring his complex and noble motives. At
critical moments in the past, the Supreme Court has compromised its legal
analysis of constitutional issues in order to defuse potentially explosive
political conflicts and safeguard the Court’s institutional authority. Two
prominent examples from the Rehnquist Court are Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey91 and Dickerson v. United States.92
Each of those decisions reaffirmed a controversial precedent—Roe v.
Wade93 in Casey; Miranda v. Arizona94 in Dickerson—for which public
support appeared to have decreased over time. Each decision imposed or
indulged significant constraints on the challenged precedent, vindicating the
Court’s institutional authority while simultaneously adjusting to changed
political norms.95 Both decisions dialed down, to some extent and for some
years, legal controversy about the precedents at issue. NFIB arguably shares
key characteristics with Casey and Dickerson. The Court has long promoted
an expansive vision of federal power; however, a majority of the public, at
the time the Court handed down NFIB, opposed the PPACA.96 Chief Justice
90
Sam Bagenstos argues that reading several distinct strands of Chief Justice Roberts’s anticoercion
rhetoric as conjunctive requirements for a coercion claim might render the Court’s anticoercion holding
in NFIB manageable. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013). As with the Chief Justice’s deficient analysis of the taxpenalty
distinction, see supra note 63, the fact that a top-flight legal scholar can devise reasoning to explain a
legal opinion does not make the opinion itself legally coherent.
91
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the constitutional right to abortion, upholding some state
restrictions on abortion, and rejecting others).
92
530 U.S. 428 (2000) (affirming the constitutional status of Miranda warnings and striking down a
federal statute as inconsistent with Miranda).
93
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the Due Process Clause protects a woman’s right to have an
abortion).
94
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring arresting officers to advise arrestees formally of specific
constitutional procedural rights).
95
See Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars,
118 YALE L.J. 1318, 1325–30 (2009) (describing Casey as the Court’s effort to reconcile the right to
abortion with prevailing public ambivalence about abortion); Donald A. Dripps, Constitutional Theory
for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continuing Quest for Broad-but-shallow, 43 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1, 35 (2001) (contending that Dickerson compromised the force of Miranda by
accommodating “inconsistent and unprincipled” intervening cases that had weakened the Miranda rule).
96
See Peter Baker, For Obama, a Signature Issue That the Public Never Embraced Looms Large,
N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/politics/health-care-overhaul-isstill-no-hit-with-public.html (describing the unpopularity of the PPACA and noting polling data shortly
before NFIB that found public support for the Act at 34%).
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Roberts’s opinion, by its defenders’ account, manages to vindicate the
Court’s established constitutional judgment, make reasonable concessions
to changed public norms, and safeguard the Court’s institutional authority.97
To the extent Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB abdicated legal analysis in
order to address political threats to the Court’s institutional interest, his
opinion embodies lawlessness in the normative sense. Even so, his
defenders seek to justify that normative lawlessness on institutional
grounds. I share their premise that constitutional law overlaps substantially
and inevitably with politics, such that courts cannot and should not bar
certain political considerations from constitutional adjudication. I also agree
that the Court has a responsibility to safeguard its institutional authority,
and my antipathy toward much of the substantive reasoning in Casey and
Dickerson does not prevent me from viewing those decisions as properly
having taken public perceptions of the Court’s precedents into account.
Finally, I agree that the Chief Justice of the United States has a distinctive
responsibility to guard the Court’s institutional authority, and the notion
that such an institutional concern substantially motivated Chief Justice
Roberts’s lead opinion in NFIB seems reasonable. Measured against that
goal, however, his opinion fails to justify his disregard for legal analysis.
NFIB differs materially from Casey and Dickerson. Those two
decisions involved divisive political issues—abortion and coerced
confessions—that the Supreme Court had recently chosen to
constitutionalize. Both issues continued to figure prominently in public
political debates after the Court’s intervention. The Court in Casey and
Dickerson made or validated politically beneficial concessions on the
underlying legal issues in order to preserve, at least nominally, the
challenged precedents’ essential holdings. In contrast, while the federal–
state balance of power has inspired strong political disagreements
throughout our history, federal courts from the beginning have mediated
federalism disputes.98 The constitutional law of federal power has stayed
remarkably stable for the past seventy-five years, with public opposition to
the Court’s doctrine concentrated in the debased precincts of the Jim Crow
South. The NFIB Court did not confront the difficult balance between
adherence to precedent and attention to changed political norms that
characterize Casey and Dickerson. The Justices merely faced the danger
that, should they choose to depart from their own precedents by limiting
federal power, opponents of the result would accuse the Court of judicial
activism.
But even if that danger—a perennial occupational hazard of
constitutional judging—somehow justified the same sort of departure from
ordinary norms of adjudication seen in Casey and Dickerson, Chief Justice
97

See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 3 (claiming that “Roberts’ decision was above all an act of judicial
statesmanship” and that “Roberts chose to place institutional legitimacy front and center”).
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See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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Roberts’s NFIB opinion would earn low marks for institutional selfdefense. Consideration of three possible varieties of judicial activism
complaints exposes his failure.
First, in the difficulty most closely tied to the federalism issues at the
heart of NFIB, the Court ran the risk of appearing unduly activist for
broadly moving toward a more restrictive view of federal regulatory power.
Chief Justice Roberts’s NFIB opinion pours rocket fuel on that fire.
Although the Chief Justice’s discussion of the commerce power and the
Necessary and Proper Clause makes no actual law,99 that deficit reflects no
lack of effort. The Chief Justice, as enthusiastically as the joint dissenters,
veers far out of his way to craft the “actioninaction” distinction as a brandnew constraint on the commerce power. His attack on congressional power
ranges beyond the Commerce Clause to the Necessary and Proper Clause,
the spending power, and—given his apparent revival of the taxpenalty
distinction100—even the taxing power. Analytical deficiencies aside, his
opinion mounts the most comprehensive assault on federal authority in the
Court’s history. His one departure from a restrictive reading of federal
power, upholding the individual mandate under the Taxing Clause, comes
off as rhetorically halfhearted, legally narrow, and shakily persuasive at
best.101 Five Justices now stand on record as eager to reopen federalism
battles long thought settled. Activism accomplished.
Second, critics might have charged the Court with judicial activism for
striking down a momentous piece of federal social policy legislation and
thus transgressing the separation of powers. The Chief Justice’s supposed
effort to avoid this charge still managed, by excising the funding penalty
from the Act’s Medicaid expansion, to engineer the Court’s most important
weakening of a federal statute since the early years of the New Deal.102
Several conservative governors seized on the Court’s decision as a basis for
refusing to implement the Medicaid expansion.103 The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that such recalcitrance will thwart the PPACA
from delivering insurance to three million people.104 The governors’
resistance represents a startling rebellion against congressional action in a
sphere of undeniably national scope, orchestrated by Chief Justice Roberts.
The mandate’s survival thus represents only a marginal victory for judicial
99
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deference to Congress, and how substantial is even that marginal victory?
Judicial restraint ordinarily entails robust deference to elected officials’
judgment. In this case, the Chief Justice upheld the individual mandate only
after savaging Congress’s professed basis for enacting it and wanly
embracing a narrower justification that the government pressed with little
enthusiasm. The PPACA remains alive, but it rests on a hollow legal
foundation.
Finally, critics might have called the Court activist for voting along
predictable ideological lines in a politically sensitive case. Here the fanfare
for Chief Justice Roberts reaches its crescendo: he courageously broke with
his conservative allies to side with the Court’s liberals!105 But his opinion
breaks with conservative dogma only in a thin sense, upholding the
individual mandate on the narrowest available ground while effectively
gutting the Medicaid expansion and promulgating a manifesto on the evils
of excessive federal power. The bulk of NFIB, in fact, breaks down along
familiar lines: only the Chief Justice’s heavily compromised vote to uphold
the individual mandate and Justices Breyer and Kagan’s inscrutable
acquiescence in weakening the Medicaid expansion depart from the usual
partisan script.
In any event, this third sort of complaint about judicial activism—in
contrast to the complaints grounded in federalism and the separation of
powers—deserves far less attention than the Chief Justice’s defenders claim
he gave it. If a politically polarized public reads the Court’s divisions of
legal opinion as mirroring the public’s own political divide, so what?
Principled Justices should ignore the danger of appearing partisan as surely
as they should resist actual partisan motives. Even if we suppose the Chief
Justice should vote against his legal convictions in order to counter
impressions of a partisan divide, how often should he do so, and why did
NFIB present the right occasion for falling on his sword? Do the Chief
Justice’s recent opinion for a 5–4 conservative majority that struck down
the preclearance formula of the Voting Rights Act106 and his dissent from a
similarly “party-line” 5–4 decision to strike down the Defense of Marriage
Act107 belie his diplomatic sacrifice in NFIB? Or did the supposed sacrifice
exacerbate the Court’s partisan divide by providing strategic cover for the
later, ideologically regular actions?
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in NFIB ultimately resembles Casey
and Dickerson far less than it resembles a case in which the Rehnquist
Court reached a very different sort of accommodation between law and
politics: Bush v. Gore.108 The comparison may surprise observers who insist
105
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the Chief Justice’s decision to uphold the individual mandate transcended
politics; but the contrast between Casey and Dickerson, on one hand, and
Bush v. Gore, on the other, casts an unflattering light on NFIB. In Casey
and Dickerson, the Court attempted to fashion legal rules that would both
accommodate political realities and provide meaningful guidance for future
cases. In contrast, the Court in Bush v. Gore notoriously announced an
equal protection holding that bears scant resemblance to prior doctrine, then
proclaimed that its holding lacked any precedential force.109 The Court
constructed a Potemkin legal analysis in order to achieve—on the least
cynical view of its motives—short-term political stability. The Chief
Justice’s opinion in NFIB uses similar means to achieve a similar end,
tossing off unsupported or half-formed arguments to defuse immediate
political concerns about the individual mandate. Ironically, public antipathy
toward Bush v. Gore probably accounted in large part for whatever
institutional vulnerability the Court faced in NFIB. How could repeating the
earlier decision’s mistakes do anything, in the long run, but further erode
public confidence in the Court?
A coda: No evaluation of Chief Justice Roberts’s institutional
stewardship in NFIB should ignore the horrific optics of the Court’s
performance. In Casey, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter filed a
joint majority opinion that placed an unprecedented “centrist” coalition
behind the Court’s qualified reaffirmation of Roe. In Dickerson, Chief
Justice Rehnquist rallied a solid majority of the Court behind his qualified
reaffirmation of Miranda. In sharp contrast with those decisions, most of
Chief Justice Roberts’s lead opinion in NFIB speaks for him alone, and
almost all of it appears to reflect his distinctive reasoning. A few cursory
lines from Justice Ginsburg contain the only words of direct support for the
Chief Justice’s reasoning that any other Justice committed to paper,110 and
Justice Ginsburg spends the rest of her sixty-one-page opinion beating him
bloody. Justices Breyer and Kagan, whose votes to limit the Medicaid
expansion provide the Chief Justice with his only other alliance across
ideological lines, spill not a drop of ink in his defense. The Chief Justice’s
fellow conservatives, whose bizarre joint dissent echoes much of what he
argues, virtually ignore his opinion and decline to join a line of it. The
opinion thus imposes on the PPACA the Chief Justice’s own individual
mandate. Within a few days of the decision, the media was buzzing with
conflicting accounts and accusations about the Chief Justice’s errant
behavior during the deliberations and drafting.111 These tales told out of
109
See id. at 109 (stating that “[o]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities”).
110
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2629 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
111
The bombshell report that Chief Justice Roberts had changed his vote on the individual mandate
and alienated his conservative colleagues in the process came from Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched
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school do nothing to diminish the decision’s legal authority, and they prove
nothing even at the level of gossip. Even so, they appear to have leaked
from highly placed sources inside the Court, betraying a climate of
dysfunction and recrimination.112 No capable defender of the Court’s
institutional reputation would foster such mayhem, let alone allow the
public to see it splashed across the headlines.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of NFIB v. Sebelius, praise has rained down on Chief
Justice Roberts for writing the opinion that upholds the PPACA’s
individual mandate. Whatever one’s view about any of the decision’s
bottom-line results, the adulation is unwarranted. The Chief Justice’s
opinion exemplifies lawless judicial decisionmaking, in both the descriptive
sense of failing to state or justify legal conclusions and the normative sense
of violating bedrock legal precepts. History will validate the Chief Justice’s
pivotal role in NFIB only if we ignore his parade of offenses against
responsible judicial review and cogent legal reasoning. Liberals who rejoice
that the Chief Justice saved the Act, conservatives who welcome his assault
on federal power, and centrists who commend him for lifting the Court
above crass partisanship should all look past his opinion’s rhetoric to its
brittle and hazardous core. The Chief Justice’s individual mandate in NFIB
provides an important, troubling model of how the Supreme Court should
not make decisions.
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